



## **Efficient Capital Markets: II**

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## Structure of the Article

- I) The Theme
- II) The Main Areas of Research
- III) Return Predictability
- IV) Cross-Sectional Return Predictability
- V) Event Studies
- VI) Tests for Private Information
- VII) Conclusions

### I. The Theme

#### **MARKET EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS**

“ Security prices fully reflect all available information”

STRONG version : The costs of getting prices to reflect information are ZERO.

WEAKER version : The marginal benefits of action on info do NOT exceed the marginal costs.

### I. The Theme

The extreme version of the MEH is FALSE

BUT

It is a **CLEAN BENCHMARK**  
in deciding  
what are *reasonable* information and trading costs.

### I. The Theme

Market efficiency *per se* is NOT TESTABLE.  
It needs an asset-pricing model.

#### JOINT-HYPOTHESIS PROBLEM

It is not possible to measure ‘abnormal’ returns  
without expected returns predicted by pricing models.

### II. The Main Areas of Research

*The Journal of Finance*, Vol. 25, No. 2, May 1970, pp. 383-417

#### **1970 REVIEW**

EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS: A REVIEW OF  
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL WORK\*

EUGENE F. FAMA\*\*

The 1970 review categorized Market Efficiency into 3-groups:

- (1) Weak-Form Tests
- (2) Semi-Strong-Form Tests
- (3) Strong-Form Tests

### 1970 REVIEW

#### ASSUMPTION:

Security prices at any time ‘**fully reflect**’ all available information.  
A market in which prices always fully reflect available information is called ‘**efficient**.’

Successive price changes are *independent*.  
Successive changes are *identically distributed*.

} **RANDOM WALK**

## 1970 REVIEW

### EVIDENCE:

*“like any other extreme null hypothesis,  
we do not expect it to be literally true”*

Empirical work concerned the adjustment of security prices to  
**‘three relevant information subsets’**


**WEAK-FORM**

**SEMI-STRONG-FORM**

**STRONG-FORM**



## 1970 REVIEW



**STRONG-FORM TESTS**

*Private (+public) information..?*

**SEMI-STRONG-FORM TESTS**

*Public announcements..?*

**WEAK-FORM TESTS**

*Past returns..?*

### II. The Main Areas of Research

The efficiency categories are changed in 1991:

Weak-form tests → Tests for return predictability  
(dividend yields & interest rates)

Semi-strong-form tests → Event studies

Strong-form tests → Tests for private information

### II. The Main Areas of Research

The efficiency categories are changed in 1991:

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(dividend yields & interest rates)

Semi-strong-form tests → Event studies

Strong-form tests → Tests for private information

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

Since 1970 the vast bulk of the research on market efficiency has examined the validity of the weak-form efficiency: Whether asset prices reflect all historical information (*time-series predictability of stock returns*)

Recent tests consider the forecast power of variables;

- Dividend Yields (D/P),
- Earnings/Price Ratio (E/P),
- Term-Structure Variables

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

Fama refers these studies as Tests for Return Predictability

Classifying these tests into:

**A. Past Returns**

- A.1. Short-Horizon Returns**
- A.2. Long-Horizon Returns**
- A.3. The Contrarians**

**B. Other Forecasting Variables**

**C. Volatility Tests and  
Seasonals in Returns**

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

Pre-1970 Literature: Expected returns are constant through time  
Market efficiency implies that returns are unpredictable from past returns or other past variables and the best forecast of a return is its historical mean.

Recent Works including *daily* data find that weekly returns on portfolios grouped according to size show reliable positive autocorrelation. → reject the RANDOM WALK..!!

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

##### “Short-Horizon Returns”

With the CRSP (the Center for Research in Security Prices) daily data back to 1962, recent research is able to show confidently that daily and weekly returns are predictable from past returns. The work thus rejects the old market *efficiency-constant expected returns model* on a statistical basis.

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

“Long-Horizon Returns”

Autocorrelations of returns for the 1926-1985 period have the pattern predicted by the *Shiller-Summers (1986)* model which points out the market is highly inefficient. (*Fama & French 1988*)

When Fama&French (1988) delete the 1926-1940 period from the tests, the negative autocorrelation in 3-5 years disappears!!

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

“Long-Horizon Returns”

- (1) Rational pricing implies an expected return that is highly auto-correlated but mean-reverting
- (2) Shocks to expected returns are uncorrelated with shocks to expected dividends

Irrational bubbles in stock prices are indistinguishable from rational time-varying expected returns.

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS “The Contrarians”

DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987): MARKET OVERREACTION  
*unmasking irrational bubbles*  
*“to extreme bad or good news about firms”*

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

“Other Forecasting Variables”

Power in tests for return predictability can be enhanced if one can identify forecasting variables that are **less noisy proxies** for expected returns than past returns.

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

##### “Other Forecasting Variables”

- Fama and French (1988b) use **D/P** to forecast returns for horizons from 1 month to 5 years. *D/P explains small fractions of monthly and quarterly return variances.*
- Campbell and Shiller (1988b) find that **E/P** ratios have *reliable forecast power that also increases with the return horizon.*

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

“Other Forecasting Variables”

- There is no evidence that low D/P signals bursting bubbles, that is, negative expected stock returns.(Fama&French-1988)
- Deciding whether return predictability is the result of rational variation in exp. returns or irrational bubbles is never clearcut.

### III. Return Predictability: Time-Varying Expected Returns

#### PAST RETURNS

“Volatility Tests and Seasonals in Returns”

- Expected stock and bond returns vary with expected inflation rates, interest rates, and other term-structure variables.
- **Seasonals** to be explained in terms of market micro-structure in the probabilities that measured prices are at ask or bid (*Monday returns, January effect, end-of-month returns etc.*)

### IV. Cross-Sectional Return Predictability

#### The Sharpe-Lintner-Black (SLB) Model

- The SLB model is just a model and so surely false.
- The proxies used for the market portfolio do not come close to the portfolio.
- Estimates of market  $\beta$ 's are noisy.
- The anomalies variables are correlated with true  $\beta$ 's.
- The SLB model gave a summary measure of risk, market  $\beta$ , interpreted as market sensitivity.

### IV. Cross-Sectional Return Predictability

#### Multifactor Models

- The multifactor model leaves an unexplained SIZE EFFECT much like the SLB model; that is, expected returns are too high for small stocks and too low for large stocks.
- There is the danger that measured relations between returns and economic factors are spurious.

### IV. Cross-Sectional Return Predictability

#### Consumption-Based Asset-Pricing Models

- The consumption-based model is the most elegant of the intertemporal asset pricing models.
- The tests use versions of the model that make strong assumptions about **tastes** and the **joint distribution of consumption growth and returns**.
- The consumption model sometimes fail the test of usefulness.

### IV. Cross-Sectional Return Predictability

#### Where Do We Stand?

- The consumption-based model fares worse than the SLB.
- The multifactor model seems to do better.
- BUT the estimating way the  $\beta$ 's of economic factors is vague.
- Because these models are NOT mutually exclusive, we have some freedom to lean on one model or another.

### V. Event Studies

- The typical result in event studies on daily data is that stock prices seem to adjust within a day to event announcements.
- Event studies are the **cleanest evidence** we have on efficiency (the least encumbered by the joint-hypothesis problem). With few exceptions, the evidence is supportive.

### VI. Tests for Private Information

- Jaffe's (1974) study of insider trading is one of the first, finding that for insiders the stock market is NOT EFFICIENT; insiders have information that is not reflected in prices.
- Seyhun (1986) offers an explanation, arguing that Jaffe's outsider profits arise because of usage the SLB model.
- Highly constrained asset pricing models have systematic problems explaining the cross-section of expected returns that can look like market inefficiencies.

### VII. Conclusions

- Prices adjust efficiently to firm-specific information.
- The tests thus run head-on into the joint-hypothesis problem: measured abnormal returns can result from market inefficiency, a bad model of market equilibrium, or problems in the way the model is implemented.
- Returns for short and long horizons are predictable from D/P, E/P, and default spreads of low- over high-grade bond yields.

### VII. Conclusions

- Term spreads (LT-ST interest rates) and the level of short rates also forecast returns out to about a year.
- The forecast power of D/P, E/P, and the term-structure variables is reliable for periods after the Great Depression.
- Rational variation in expected returns is caused either by shocks to tastes for current versus future consumption or by technology shocks.

### VII. Conclusions

In the end, I think we can hope for a coherent story that (1) relates the cross-section properties of expected returns to the variation of expected returns through time, and (2) relates the behavior of expected returns to the real economy in a rather detailed way. Or we can hope to convince ourselves that no such story is possible.

THANKS  
*FOR LISTENING*